An Irreverent Guide to Value at Risk
by Barry Schachter
The opinions expressed in
this article are those of the author and do not purport
to represent the opinions of Chase Manhattan Corporation
or its staff. ©Copyright
1997. This paper appeared in Financial Engineering News, volume
1 number 1, August 1997, and was Reprinted in Risks and Rewards,
March 1998, 17-18.
INTRODUCTION
Value at Risk ("VaR")
is much on the minds of risk managers and regulators these
days, because of the promise it holds for improving risk
management. It is common to
hear the question asked, could VaR have prevented Barings,
or Orange County, or Sumitomo. No answer to questions of
that sort will be attempted
here. Instead, this essay will take a normative approach.
My purpose is more modest, namely, to provide the reader
with some background by
describing VaR and its evolving role in risk management.
Because of its technical
nature, it is customary to begin any discussion of Value
at Risk VaR with a definition. I offer three equivalent definitions.
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(1) A forecast of
a given percentile, usually in the lower tail, of the distribution
of returns on a portfolio over some period; similar in principle
to an estimate of the expected return on a portfolio, which is a
forecast of the 50th percentile.
(2) An estimate
of the level of loss on a portfolio which is expected to be
equaled or exceeded with a given, small probability.
(3) A number
invented by purveyors of panaceas for pecuniary peril intended to
mislead senior management and regulators into false confidence
that market risk is adequately understood and controlled. |
THE QUEST FOR THE "HOLY SCALE"
Folklore (if it is fair
to attribute as folklore that which only dates back five years) tells us
that VaR was developed to provide a single number which could encapsulate
information about the risk in a portfolio, could be calculated rapidly (by
4:15), _and_ could communicate that information to nontechncial senior
managers. Tall order, and not one that could be delivered upon without
compromises.
Modern Portfolio Theory
("MPT"), as taught in business schools, tells us that the risk
in a portfolio can be proxied by the portfolio standard deviation, a
measure of spread in a distribution. That is, standard deviation is all
you need to know in order to (1) encapsulate all the information about
risk that is relevant, and (2) construct risk-based rules for optimal risk
"management" decisions. [The more technically proficient will
please forgive my playing somewhat fast and loose with the theory in the
interests of clarity.] Strangely, when applied to the quest for the Holy
Scale, standard deviation loses its appeal found in MPT. First, managers
think of risk in terms of dollars of loss, whereas standard deviation
defines risk in terms of deviations (!), either above or below, expected
return and is therefore not intuitive. Second, in trading portfolios
deviations of a given amount below expected return do not occur with the
same likelihood as deviations above, as a result of positions in options
and option-like instruments, whereas the use of standard deviation for
risk management assumes symmetry.
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"VaR was
developed to provide a single number which could encapsulate
information about the risk in a portfolio"
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An alternative measure of
risk was therefore required. Why not measure the spread of returns, then,
by estimating the loss associated with a given, small probability of
occurrence. Higher spread, or risk, should mean a higher loss at the given
probability. Then senior management can be told that there is 1 in 100,
say, chance of losing X dollars over the holding period. Not only is this
intuitively appealing, but it's easy to show that when returns are
normally distributed (symmetric), the information conveyed is exactly the
same as were standard deviation employed, it's just that the scale is
different. This approach can be consistent with MPT. It seems, then that
perhaps the Holy Scale has been found in VaR.
THE SLIP 'TWIXT CUP AND LIP
It's perhaps too easy to
criticise efforts to implement the VaR concept. It takes some courage to
venture into unfamilar terrain and missteps are inevitable. The VaR
paradigm is still evolving (as is that of financial risk management in
general) and experimentation should be encouraged. To speak of "best
practices" is surely premature.
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"To speak
of 'best practices' is surely premature"
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The general approaches to
VaR computation have fallen into three classes called parametric,
historical simulation, and Monte Carlo. Parametric VaR is most closely
tied to MPT, as the VaR is expressed as a multiple of the standard
deviation of the portfolio's return. Historical simulation expresses the
distribution of portfolio returns as a bar chart or histogram of
hypothetical returns. Each hypothetical return is calculated as that which
would be earned on today's portfolio if a day in the history of market
rates and prices were to repeat itself. The VaR then is read from this
histogram. Monte Carlo also expresses returns as a histogram of
hypothetical returns. In this case the hypothetical returns are obtained
by choosing at random from a given distribution of price and rate changes
estimated with historical data. Each of these approaches have strengths
and weaknesses.
The parametric approach
has as its principal virtue speed in computation. The quality of the VaR
estimate degrades with portfolios of nonlinear instruments. Departures
from normality in the portfolio return distribution also represent a
problem for the parametric approach. Historical simulation (my personal
favorite) is free from distributional assumptions, but requires the
portfolio be revalued once for every day in the historical sample period.
Because the histogram from which the VaR is estimated is calculated using
actual historical market price changes, the range of portfolio value
changes possible is limited. Monte Carlo VaR is not limited by price
changes observed in the sample period, because revaluations are based on
sampling from an estimated distribution of price changes. Monte Carlo
usually involves many more repricings of the portfolio than historical
simulation and is therefore the most expensive and time consuming
approach.
RULE OR TOOL?
It seems that VaR is
being used for just about every need; risk reporting, risk limits,
regulatory capital, internal capital allocation and performance
measurement. Yet, VaR is not the answer for all risk management
challenges.
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"No
theory exists to show that VaR is the appropriate measure upon
which to build optimal decision rules"
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No theory exists to show
that VaR is the appropriate measure upon which to build optimal decision
rules. VaR does not measure "event" (e.g., market crash) risk.
That is why portfolio stress tests are recommended to supplement VaR. VaR
does not readily capture liquidity differences among instruments. That is
why limits on both tenors and option greeks are still useful. VaR doesn't
readily capture model risks, which is why model reserves are also
necessary.
Because VaR does not
capture all relevant information about market risk, its best use is as a
tool in the hands of a good risk manager. Nevertheless, VaR is a very
promising tool; one that will continue to evolve rapidly because of the
intense interest in it by practitioners, regulators and academics.
Page authored by:
Barry Schachter.
(Courtesy:
www.gloriamundi.org.
Reproduced with permission. All trademarks belong to the author)
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